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19. RESTITUTION 
YEO TIONG MIN 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), BCL, DPhil (Oxford); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. 
Introduction 
19.1 In the year under review, there have been a number of very 
important observations by the Singapore Court of Appeal especially on the 
equitable side of the law of restitution. Highlights include the acceptance of 
the power to order an account of profits for breach of contract in exceptional 
circumstances; the suggestion that the account of profits remedy could be 
more widely available, beyond breaches of contract, in equity’s auxiliary 
jurisdiction coming in aid of common law and statutory rights; and the use 
of equitable subrogation as a tool to reverse unjust enrichment in 
appropriate cases.  
Restitution for wrongs 
Account of profits for breach of contract 
19.2 In the important but controversial case of Attorney General v Blake 
[2001] 1 AC 268 (“AG v Blake”), the House of Lords departed from the 
entrenched principle in contract law that the plaintiff is only entitled to 
compensation for his losses arising from a breach of contract. Although the 
decision has received a cool reception in Australia, principally because of a 
difference of view on the objectives of contract law (see Hospitality Group Pty 
Ltd v Australian Rugby Union Ltd (2001) 110 FCR 157 at [155]–[159]; 
Multigroup Distribution Services Pty Ltd v TNT Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 
191 ALR 402; Biscayne Partners Pty Ltd v Valance Corp Pty Ltd [2003] 
NSWSC 874 at [228]–[237]), it has been very influential in Singapore law. 
19.3 The first time the principle of restitution for breach of contract was 
considered by the Singapore Court of Appeal was in Friis v Casetech Trading 
Pte Ltd [2000] 3 SLR 590, before the House of Lords delivered its decision in 
AG v Blake, where the court only had the benefit of the English Court of 
Appeal decision in Attorney General v Blake [1998] Ch 439. In Friis v Casetech 
Trading Pte Ltd, the Singapore Court of Appeal, in obiter (the court did not 
consider that the restitutionary remedy was warranted on the facts), cited (at 
[39]) with approval the observations of Lord Woolf MR in the English Court 
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of Appeal (at 458) on the availability of restitutionary awards for breach of 
contract in two situations: when the defendant fails to provide the full extent 
of the services he had contracted to provide and for which he has charged the 
plaintiff; and where the defendant has obtained his profit by doing the very 
thing which he had contracted not to do. This must now be read in the light 
of the House of Lords decision and a subsequent Court of Appeal decision in 
Singapore. 
19.4 The House of Lords in AG v Blake (supra para 19.2), while affirming 
the availability of restitutionary awards for breach of contract, confined its 
decision to the account of profits in exceptional circumstances, and rejected 
the two guidelines in the Court of Appeal (supra para 19.3) as unreliable 
guides to the existence of the requisite exceptional circumstances. In Teh 
Guek Ngor Engelin née Tan v Chia Ee Lin Evelyn [2005] 3 SLR 22, the 
Singapore Court Appeal, affirming the High Court decision of Chia Ee Lin 
Evelyn v Teh Guek Ngor Engelin née Tan [2004] 4 SLR 330, restated Singapore 
law to be in accordance with the House of Lords decision in AG v Blake. The 
case arose from an alleged wrongful termination of a consultancy contract. 
The respondent alleged that the appellant had wrongfully terminated the 
consultancy agreement and had failed to pay the respondent the share of 
profits to which she was entitled under the agreement. The trial judge found 
in the respondent’s favour. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the 
findings of the trial judge, challenged by the appellants, that there was no 
agreement of compromise between the parties after the alleged termination, 
that the consultancy agreement had not been terminated by mutual consent, 
and that there was no oral agreement that the respondent was to refund to 
the appellant a share of the profits to which the respondent had been entitled 
under the consultancy agreement. 
19.5 The point of interest for this chapter arose from the appeal on the 
point of damages. Although the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had 
been correct in his application of the principles of law to the quantification 
of the damages for the breach of contract (and therefore dismissed the appeal 
on all grounds), it made important obiter observations on an alternative 
remedy sought by the respondent. Although the respondent had claimed 
damages for wrongful termination of the consultancy agreement, she had, in 
the alternative, sought an order for an account of all sums due to her from 
the appellant. The Court of Appeal took this to be effectively a request for the 
equitable remedy for an account of profits. The court took the opportunity 
to state the law of Singapore on the availability of this remedy for breach of 
contract. 
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19.6 The Court of Appeal emphasised that the normal remedy for breach 
of contract remains compensatory (at [17]). However, taking the lead from 
the judgment of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in AG v Blake, the court 
accepted that the remedy of account of profits would be available only in 
exceptional circumstances. The following passage from Lord Nicholls’ speech 
(at 285) was emphasised by the Court of Appeal and bears repeating: 
No fixed rules can be prescribed. The court will have regard to all the 
circumstances, including the subject matter of the contract, the purpose of 
the contractual provision which has been breached, the circumstances in 
which the breach occurred, the consequences of the breach and the 
circumstances in which relief is being sought. A useful general guide, 
although not exhaustive, is whether the plaintiff had a legitimate interest in 
preventing the defendant’s profit-making activity and, hence, in depriving 
him of his profit. 
19.7 Significantly, the court also endorsed Lord Nicholls’ statement (ibid) 
that neither of the two suggested guidelines from Lord Woolf MR in the 
English Court of Appeal (supra para 19.3) would, by themselves, constitute 
good reasons for ordering an account of profits. The Singapore Court of 
Appeal made it clear (at [18]) that the remedy of an account of profits would 
not be available for cases of wrongful termination generally. The court noted 
(ibid) the unusual relationship between the parties: although it was based on 
a consultancy contract, the respondent had additional duties and was entitled 
to a share of the profits, yet this was not enough to amount to exceptional 
circumstances for an account of profits. 
19.8 This clarification of the applicability of the principle in AG v Blake 
for Singapore is welcome, even if its application in England has caused 
difficulty. The English courts are just beginning to grapple with the cases 
coming before them, and no firmer guideline on the scope of the principle 
than what has been stated above has so far emerged. The relationship 
between the (equitable) account of the entire profits awarded in AG v Blake 
itself and (common law) restitutionary damages of a percentage of the 
profits made from the breach of the contract (an alternative justification of 
the award in Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc [2003] FSR 46 
(“Hendrix”), especially at [26], [34]–[35]) by analogy with the statutory 
jurisdiction to award damages in lieu of an injunction (Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Rev Ed), s 18(2), First Schedule, para 14; and 
Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 (“Wrotham 
Park”)) remains to be worked out. In AG v Blake, Lord Nicholls (with whom 
Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Browne-Wilkinson agreed) considered the 
Wrotham Park line of authorities as a crucial step in the analysis leading to 
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the restitutionary account of profits remedy (at 283–284), Lord Steyn put it 
to one side (at 291), and Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough (dissenting) saw it 
as clearly compensatory (at 298). Hendrix itself (at [34]) suggests that the 
common law remedy has been freed from the fetters of the statutory 
jurisdiction (which depends on the actual availability of injunctive 
remedies). While the common law remedy would be available as of right, it 
may be confined to cases protecting recognised property interests; otherwise 
it would become a normal remedy for every breach of contract (see para 19.6 
above), since every breach of contract involves the deprivation by the party in 
breach of something valuable from the innocent party, be it the (user) value 
of the right in question or the opportunity to bargain for release from the 
contractual obligation. There are other difficulties: the relationship between 
the common law, equitable, and statutory remedies that provide restitution 
for breach of contract; the appropriate quantum of the award; the scope of 
what amounts to exceptional circumstances that merit a restitutionary 
remedy; and, at least in other jurisdictions which have expanded their law on 
exemplary damages, the relationship between this restitutionary remedy and 
exemplary damages for breach of contract (see eg, Bank of America Canada v 
Clarica Trust Company [2002] 2 SCR 601; in Singapore law, see CHS CPO 
GmbH v Vikas Goel [2005] 3 SLR 202 at [66]–[67]). These are legal issues 
that await further clarification from the courts in the Commonwealth. 
19.9 Moreover, this clarification of the scope of AG v Blake for Singapore 
law is welcome, even if on the facts this may not even have been a case where 
a restitutionary remedy was being sought. An account of profits is a remedy 
with many faces. It appears from the High Court decision in Chia Ee Lin 
Evelyn v Teh Guek Ngor Engelin née Tan (supra para 19.4, at [2]) that the 
respondent’s “claim is for an account of all sums due to her under the 
relevant written consultancy agreement and payment to her of all sums 
found due”. This appears to be nothing more than asking for the performance 
of the contract; the remedy of account sought is used as a means to enforce a 
primary contractual right to the payment of a share of the profits. In so far as 
there is a restitutionary response from the law in this context, the right to 
restitution arises from the consent of the parties. There is no question of 
proving exceptional circumstances in order to get this remedy; the court is 
merely ordering the payment of a sum of money due under a contract. It is 
analogous to an action for an agreed sum at common law. A contractual 
account remedy is different from damages for breach of contract, though in 
many cases the plaintiff may end up getting the same amount of money. The 
crucial distinction is that in the former case, the rules of causation, 
remoteness and mitigation, which go to define the loss of the plaintiff, are 
irrelevant. 
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19.10 On the other hand, the remedy of account of profits in AG v Blake 
addresses a different situation, where there is no primary contractual right to 
the profits, but the plaintiff is asking for an account of profits as a remedy for 
breach of contract; in the language of rights, the plaintiff is seeking to enforce 
a secondary right to restitution, much as a plaintiff ordinarily seeks to enforce 
a secondary right to damages for breach of contract. The restitutionary 
response in AG v Blake arises from the event of a wrong – the breach of 
contract. Of course, the restitutionary account of profits for breach of 
contract argument could also have been mounted in Teh Guek Ngor Engelin 
née Tan v Chia Ee Lin Evelyn (it can be raised in any case of breach of 
contract). The Court of Appeal (supra para 19.4 at [17]) also saw the claim as 
one for “an account of all sums due” [emphasis added] to the respondent, but 
it is not clear why it was assumed that the (restitutionary) sums were due 
because of the breach of contract. The remarks of the Court of Appeal must 
be understood in this context. 
Account of profits for other wrongs? 
19.11 Ng Bok Eng Holdings Pte Ltd v Wong Ser Wan [2005] 4 SLR 561 is a 
very important case that extended the remedy of an account of profits 
beyond breaches of contract. It is even more important in its statement of the 
flexibility of the equitable jurisdiction in Singapore. With this case, the 
Singapore Court of Appeal has also demonstrated that equity (in the law of 
restitution and elsewhere) is very much alive in Singapore, and capable of 
incremental expansion to meet new situations.  
19.12 The facts can be simplified for the purpose of this review. N, the 
then husband of the respondent, had transferred an immovable property and 
shares in a company respectively to the two appellants, two companies 
owned and controlled by N and his family members, at a time when his 
marriage with the respondent was in difficulties. The transfers had been 
executed before N became a bankrupt. The respondent claimed that N had 
owed her substantial sums of money under an agreement, as well as under a 
consent order pursuant to which N was supposed to pay the respondent 
maintenance. The respondent claimed that N had sold his assets to the 
appellants at a serious undervalue in order to sequestrate the assets from her 
claims, and that these transactions contravened s 73B of the Conveyancing 
and Law of Property Act (Cap 61, 1994 Rev Ed). This section provides: 
(1)  Except as provided in this section, every conveyance of property, 
made whether before or after 12th November 1993, with intent to defraud 
creditors, shall be voidable, at the instance of any person thereby prejudiced. 
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(2) This section does not affect the law relating to bankruptcy for the 
time being in force. 
(3) This section does not extend to any estate or interest in property 
disposed of for valuable consideration and in good faith or upon good 
consideration and in good faith to any person not having, at the time of the 
disposition, notice of the intent to defraud creditors. 
19.13 In the High Court (Wong Ser Wan v Ng Bok Eng Holdings Pte Ltd 
[2004] 4 SLR 365), Judith Prakash J had found in the respondent’s favour. 
The court found that the elements of the respondent’s claim in accordance 
with s 73B had been made out. The court found that the respondent was a 
creditor of N, who had acted fraudulently to reduce the matrimonial assets to 
which the respondent would be entitled, and that the appellants, being under 
N’s control, were affixed with N’s knowledge and had not purchased the 
assets in good faith, even though they had paid US$2m and US$1m for the 
immovable property and the shares respectively. (The immovable property 
was estimated to be worth between US$5m and US$8m). The court set aside 
the transactions, and also ordered the appellants to account for the profits 
received or made by the appellants in receiving the two assets. 
19.14 The appellants appealed on four main grounds: (a) that N had no 
intention to defraud his creditors at the time the assets were transferred; 
(b) that at the time of the transfers, the respondent was not a creditor of N 
who had been prejudiced by the transfers; (c) that even if N had the requisite 
intention, the appellants had no notice of the intention; and (d) the High 
Court should not have made an order to account. 
19.15 On the first issue, the Court of Appeal (supra para 9.11) affirmed the 
finding of fact by the High Court that N had transferred the assets with 
fraudulent intention. The Court of Appeal was of the view that there was 
direct evidence of such intention. It also observed (at [31]–[32]) that, even if 
there was no direct evidence, although the court would be very cautious 
about making an inference from the surrounding circumstances, there was 
sufficient evidence on the facts to justify such an inference. On the second 
issue, the Court of Appeal disallowed the argument on the basis that it was a 
new point not raised in the High Court and leave had not been sought to 
raise it. In any event, the court was clear in its mind that, in view of the 
agreement between the parties that had been breached by N many times, and 
of the consent (maintenance) order of the court under which N had fallen in 
arrears of payment, the respondent was clearly a creditor at the time of the 
transfers. Thus, the court also did not have to decide whether the protection 
in s 73B could only be invoked by creditors; the operative words for standing 
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to sue appear to be a person “prejudiced” by the transaction (cf Cadogan v 
Cadogan [1977] 1 WLR 1041). On the third issue, the appellants argued that 
it must be shown that the transferee had actual knowledge, and not just 
constructive knowledge. The Court of Appeal affirmed the finding of actual 
knowledge in the High Court, and thought it was unnecessary to rule on the 
issue whether anything beyond actual knowledge would disentitle the 
transferee from the protection of s 73B(3). 
19.16 The real point of interest for this review arises from the fourth issue. 
On this point, the appellants relied on a number of authorities to argue that 
the court would reverse the fraudulent transaction but would do no more; in 
particular, it would not order an account of profits. The Court of Appeal 
rejected this argument, and relied on its general “[p]ower to grant all reliefs 
and remedies at law and in equity” under para 14 of the First Schedule to the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Act. In a very significant pronouncement, the 
court in the present case stated (at [54]): 
While it is true that an account of profits is the traditional remedy for 
breaches of equitable obligations, it did not mean that that remedy may not 
be granted by the court in other situations. No rule should remain 
immutable in the eyes of equity. Ultimately, it is the justice of the case 
which will dictate what relief will be appropriate. 
19.17 The Court of Appeal also found the jurisdiction in AG v Blake (supra 
para 19.2) to award an account of profits in exceptional cases of breaches of 
contract to be both relevant and persuasive. The Court of Appeal said (at 
[58]) that the relevant question was whether the avoidance of the fraudulent 
transfers alone would be an adequate remedy to deal with the mischief 
behind the enactment of s 73B. The court then emphasised that no answer 
could be given in the abstract, and every case had to be decided on its own 
facts. On the facts, the court held that the account of profits should have 
been ordered from the date N became bankrupt, rather than the dates of the 
transfers, because N had the freedom to dispose of his property until that 
date. 
19.18 The court appeared to have adopted an ad hoc approach in deciding 
whether an account of profits is appropriate, and if appropriate, its quantum. 
It is probably desirable, however, that the courts should provide at least some 
broad guidelines on when and how this jurisdiction will be exercised. The 
significance of finding an underlying rationale goes beyond providing 
guidance in future cases. It may have further impact on the development of 
general restitutionary (See eg, M J Bodie, “Restitution for Fraudulent 
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Conveyances” (1992) 7 Otago L Rev 597), or compensatory, or proprietary 
remedies (including those following a tracing exercise) in such contexts. 
19.19 On a property analysis, if the court order had revested the property 
in the bankrupt’s estate retrospectively from the date of the transfer, then 
ordinarily all profits from that date should follow the ownership of the 
property as the fruits of the property. This appears to be the view taken in the 
High Court (supra para 19.13). If the basis of the award is to disgorge profits 
from a wrong, then there would appear to be no reason to allow the 
transferee to keep a part of the profits. If the basis of the award is to prevent 
the unjust enrichment of the transferee, then it could be argued that the 
profits earned before the date of N’s bankruptcy were not at the expense of 
the bankrupt’s estate because N had the freedom of disposal of the property 
up to that date. If the basis is to recompense the creditors for the direct 
damage suffered as a result of the fraudulent conveyance (see Cadogan v 
Cadogan, supra para 19.15), then it could be said that the creditors did not 
suffer the loss of profits before N’s bankruptcy because N was free to dispose 
of any profits as he wished. It appears that either compensation or the 
reversal of unjust enrichment may provide the explanation on these facts, but 
in other cases, the measure may not be the same. The losses and gains may 
not always correspond. 
19.20 The broader question that arises is whether this power to award an 
account of profits will be available in more situations, particularly in the 
auxiliary jurisdiction where equity comes to the aid of legal (common law 
and statutory) rights. Whether it is actually granted will, naturally, depend on 
the particular circumstances. Historically, courts of common law and equity 
had concurrent jurisdiction in fraudulent conveyance cases (Hobbs v Hull 
(1788) 1 Cox 445; 29 ER 1242), so this decision could be explained as the 
incremental expansion of an ancient jurisdiction. However, this was not how 
the Court of Appeal approached the issue; the analogy drawn from AG v 
Blake (supra para 19.2) and the reference to adequacy of remedies suggest 
that the court was defining its auxiliary equitable jurisdiction. It should also 
be noted that the breadth of para 14 of the First Schedule to the Supreme 
Court of Judicature Act has recently also been emphasised by the Court of 
Appeal in a different context: Chin Bay Ching v Merchant Ventures Pte Ltd 
[2005] 3 SLR 142. 
19.21 Ng Bok Eng Holdings Pte Ltd v Wong Ser Wan (supra para 19.11) has 
opened up the possibility of arguments for accounts of profits being made in, 
for example, tort claims, beyond the restitutionary claims already available in 
torts that protect property, viz, in waiver of tort, restitutionary damages and 
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damages based on the user principle. It may be that the Singapore court will, 
for example, be receptive to arguments for an account of profits in, say, an 
action for deceit, even though English law has turned its face against this 
extension (Halifax Building Society v Thomas [1996] Ch 217; Murad v Al-
Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959 at [46]). The flexible approach of the Singapore 
court suggests that it might also be amenable to the argument to use the 
account of profits as the main vehicle for disgorging profits from 
wrongdoing (Sam Doyle and David Wright, “Restitutionary Damages – The 
Unnecessary Remedy?” (2001) 25 Melb U L Rev 1). 
Subrogation to reverse unjust enrichment 
19.22 The Singapore Court of Appeal dealt with an important point of 
subrogation in United Overseas Bank Ltd v Bank of China [2006] 1 SLR 57, 
affirming the High Court in Bank of China v Yong Tze Enterprise (Pte) Ltd 
[2005] 2 SLR 761. The facts stated here are simplified. The respondent was 
the paramount mortgagee of a housing development. A house-buyer took 
partial finance from OCBC Finance Ltd (“OCBC”) to purchase one of the 
houses in the project. The developer subsequently executed a second 
mortgage over the development land in favour of the respondent. The house-
buyer refinanced the housing loan with the appellant bank, to be secured by a 
legal mortgage of the property. The developer defaulted on its loan, and so 
did the house-buyer. The appellant alleged that (a) the respondent was 
estopped by a number of representations in a letter sent to the developer 
from denying that the property would be discharged from the paramount 
mortgage upon receipt of 85% of the sale price of the property; and (b) the 
appellant had, by the principle of subrogation, stepped into the shoes of 
OCBC after paying OCBC the amount owed by the house-buyer, and was 
thereby entitled to the benefit of the representation. 
19.23 The High Court upheld the decision of the assistant registrar in 
favour of the respondent, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for 
the following reasons. On the estoppel point, the evidence, especially the 
existence of a subsequent letter from the respondent to the developer to the 
effect that the paramount mortgage would be discharged in respect of houses 
sold only upon receipt of 100% of the purchase price, did not disclose any 
representation to discharge the paramount mortgage upon receipt of 85% of 
the purchase price at the time of the appellant’s refinancing of the loan. The 
Court of Appeal noted (at [13]) that the appellant’s claim was actually 
founded on promissory estoppel, but was content for the purpose of 
argument to assume that the appellant could rely on promissory estoppel in 
the case. The court held further that even if there had been a representation, 
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in the circumstances, it was wholly unreasonable for the appellant to have 
relied on the representation without obtaining any confirmation from the 
respondent. 
19.24 The appellant’s case would have fallen at this juncture, but the court 
went on to make some interesting comments on the law of subrogation as it 
could have applied on the facts. The court noted (at [26]) that subrogation is 
based on the implied understanding of the new lender that he is to have a 
certain security for the money he has advanced to pay off the old lender. 
According to the court, this meant that the appellant would have failed on 
this point as well because there was no basis for the appellant to assert that 
there was an implied understanding that the paramount mortgage would be 
discharged in respect of the property upon payment of 85% of the purchase 
price. For the same reasons above, the appellant should have obtained 
confirmation of the position from the respondent. In other words, the basis 
for the lender’s belief in the existence of the security must be a reasonable 
one; a payer who did not take reasonable steps to secure his own position 
would not be entitled to subrogation. 
19.25 It is not clear, however, how this observation sits with the further 
observations of the court on the nature of the subrogation remedy. The court 
(at [27]) adopted the reasoning of Lord Hoffmann in Banque Financière de la 
Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221 (“Banque Financière”) that the 
equitable remedy of subrogation did not depend on the intention of the 
parties, but on the principles of unjust enrichment: whether the defendant 
had been enriched at the expense of the plaintiff, whether the enrichment 
was unjust, and whether there were reasons of policy for denying the 
restitutionary remedy. However, in the House of Lords, both Lord Steyn (at 
227) and Lord Hoffmann (at 235) asserted that carelessness was not a ground 
for denying the subrogation remedy, relying on the general position in the 
law of restitution that a careless payer is not for that reason alone disentitled 
from restitution. (For this proposition in Singapore law, see Borneo Motors 
(S) Pte Ltd v William Jacks & Co (S) Pte Ltd [1992] 2 SLR 881 at 886, [22].) 
19.26 To be consistent with Banque Financière, if carelessness did figure in 
the present case, it cannot be in the context of a mistaken assumption of the 
existence or validity of the security. This part of the case is better explained 
by the absence of an unjust factor. Could the appellant have succeeded on 
mistaken conferment of benefit here? If the basis for the claim was the 
promise to discharge the paramount mortgage over the property, it could be 
argued that there could not have been a mistake here, but only a 
misprediction which does not ground any restitutionary relief (Info-
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communications Development Authority of Singapore v Singapore 
Telecommunications Ltd (No 2) [2002] 3 SLR 488 at [107]–[113]). But the 
assumption of the existence of a binding undertaking by a third party could 
amount to a mistake (as it did in Banque Financière). Thus, it could be that 
when the court said that there was no basis for the assertion of an implied 
understanding on the conditions of the discharge of the paramount 
mortgage over the property, it did not mean that it was unreasonable for the 
appellant to hold that belief, but that, in the circumstances, it did not have 
any basis for asserting that it held that belief at all. On this basis, this would 
have been a case of no mistake, rather than an unreasonable mistake. 
19.27 Further, the court held (at [29]) that there was no basis for arguing 
that the denial of subrogation to the appellant would give rise to the unjust 
enrichment of the respondent. The court pointed out that the subrogation 
being argued for in the case was against the paramount mortgagee, not the 
borrower; a borrower could have been unjustly enriched by having the 
benefit of a discharged security effectively for nothing, but here the contest 
was between the lender and a third party, the paramount mortgagee. It is 
suggested that the true distinction is not whether the defendant is the 
borrower or a third party. In Banque Financière, a lender who had advanced 
money to pay off the first charge, without expressly providing for any 
security, but on the understanding that all other lenders within the corporate 
group would not demand repayment until the lender had been paid, was 
allowed to subrogate to the first charge because otherwise the second chargee 
would have been unjustly enriched at the lender’s expense. The second 
chargee was for all practical purposes a third party, because even though it 
was part of the group, the negotiators had no authority to bind it, which was 
why the basis of the subrogation existed in the first place. The question in 
every case is whether the defendant has been unjustly enriched at the 
plaintiff ’s expense. The real distinction between Banque Financière and 
United Overseas Bank Ltd v Bank of China is that the lender in the former had 
clearly improved the position of the second chargee, while in the present 
case, the paramount mortgagee’s position was unaffected by the refinancing 
transaction of the appellant. There was no enrichment at all. 
Tracing  
Money claims at common law and in equity 
19.28 In a previous decision, the Singapore Court of Appeal in Caltong 
(Australia) Pty Ltd v Tong Tien See Construction Pte Ltd [2002] 3 SLR 241 at 
[53] had endorsed the position stated in the House of Lords in Foskett v 
454 SAL Annual Review (2005) 
 
McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102 that tracing is a process rather than a remedy. It is 
a process to enable the plaintiff to trace what has happened to his property, 
identify persons who have handled the property, and identify the new 
property as the substitute of the original property. Tracing normally precedes 
a claim. Although the court was only concerned with equitable tracing and 
only applied equitable tracing in the case, these observations are nevertheless 
important. By identifying tracing as a process that precedes a claim, the court 
implicitly accepted the neutrality of the process to the claim. In turn, this 
appears to be an implicit acceptance of another point made in Foskett v 
McKeown (at 113 (Lord Steyn)) that the tracing process should be neutral; it 
should not differ depending on whether one is claiming at common law or 
equity. 
19.29 This had marked an important staging post from 1991 when 
Lord Goff of Chieveley in the leading case of Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd 
[1991] 2 AC 548 at 580–581 expressed the hope that the recognition of the 
principle of unjust enrichment and the defence of change of position would 
help to rationalise and harmonise tracing at common law and in equity. But 
this new staging post is couched in terms of property law, not the law of 
unjust enrichment, and there is consequently uncertainty as to the 
relationship between the law of property and the law of unjust enrichment. 
In particular, how is Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd itself to be explained? 
Was the action for money had and received made after the common law 
tracing exercise one that arose to protect property rights or to reverse an 
unjust enrichment? This fundamental theoretical difficulty aside, although 
there are clear benefits to having unified tracing rules, it is also not very clear 
what it means to have a neutral tracing process. For the present, the law is 
still in a state of flux, and tracing problems will still need to be resolved by 
the distinct substantive principles of common law and equity. The following 
case illustrates that the relationship between the law of property and the law 
of unjust enrichment, and the relationship between the common law and 
equity within the spheres of the law of property and the law of unjust 
enrichment, remain difficult to disentangle. 
“At the expense of” 
19.30 A crucial element in a cause of action based on the reversal of an 
unjust enrichment is that the benefit unjustly received by the defendant had 
been at the expense of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has to show that he was the 
source of the defendant’s enrichment. An issue of this type arose in the case 
of Chia Kin Tuck v Leong Choon Kum [2005] SGHC 1. The plaintiff had 
alleged that he paid the first defendant (his then wife) the sum of S$1m to be 
6 SAL Ann Rev 443 Restitution 455 
 
deposited in Australian banks to earn interest, to be expended on the further 
education of their children. The money was allegedly transferred to bank 
accounts belonging to the second defendant. The first defendant contended 
that the money had come from a close friend, the second defendant. At the 
trial, counsel for the second defendant also contested the plaintiff ’s 
ownership of the money he allegedly paid to the first defendant. 
19.31 The District Court ([2003] SGDC 269) dismissed the claim of the 
plaintiff, because although it found that the money received by the first 
defendant had come from the plaintiff and not the second defendant, the 
money belonged not to the plaintiff but to a partnership (the partners of 
which were the plaintiff, his mother, and a brother of the plaintiff). Upon 
appeal to the High Court, Lai Siu Chiu J affirmed the findings of the District 
Court. However, the judge varied the order of the District Court. Agreeing 
with plaintiff ’s counsel that the District Court was wrong to require the 
plaintiff to prove ownership of the money claimed, the judge thought that 
the normal legal result would have been that the plaintiff ’s claim would be 
allowed, but with additional directions from the court that the partnership 
could claim the money from the plaintiff. In the result, considering that the 
defendants were not entitled to retain the money, the judge ordered the 
second defendant to return the money (with interest) to the plaintiff ’s 
solicitors pending resolution of the issue of the beneficial ownership of the 
money. 
19.32 On the face of it, this looks like a case of equitable intervention in a 
common law suit. The plaintiff was entitled to claim at law, but the court 
imposed orders to ensure that the equitable interests were protected. This 
suggests that, in an appropriate case, even though the plaintiff can make out 
a case for the reversal of unjust enrichment against the defendant at common 
law, the court, acting in its equitable jurisdiction, may impose orders where it 
is evident that the plaintiff is not beneficially entitled to the sums paid to the 
defendant in order to protect a trust. This course of action sounds eminently 
sensible, except for the point explored below. 
Failure of conditions and claims against third parties – common law and equity 
19.33 Upon closer examination, however, the reported pleadings in the 
case revealed considerable confusion in the claim. In the District Court 
judgment (supra para 19.31), it was stated (at [2]) that the plaintiff ’s claim 
was for money had and received. This is a common law claim, the underlying 
allegation being that the defendant has come under an implied restitutionary 
obligation to return a sum of money which has been received in 
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circumstances that have unjustly enriched the defendant. This restitutionary 
obligation may arise because the defendant has received money from the 
plaintiff in circumstances which give rise to a claim based on unjust 
enrichment, or simply because the defendant has received the plaintiff ’s 
money in circumstances where the plaintiff had not intended to pass legal 
title in the money. 
19.34 The plaintiff ’s statement of claim, however, alleged that the first 
defendant had received the money on trust for the plaintiff, the money to be 
applied to the education of their children, and that the second defendant had 
received the money from the first defendant knowing that the transfer had 
been made in trust. The claim looks totally inconsistent. If the allegation is 
that there was a trust, then legal title must have passed to the trustee (the first 
defendant), who could pass legal title to the second defendant. There is no 
scope for the beneficiaries to sue in the common law action for money had 
and received (see the analogous case of MCC Proceeds Inc v Lehman Bros 
International (Europe) [1998] 4 All ER 675). Moreover, assuming standing to 
sue, while a common law action in money had and received could lie where a 
recipient has received money (legal title passing) for a particular purpose and 
then failed to perform that purpose, it is difficult to see how a common law 
action for money had and received can lie against a subsequent recipient 
unless the plaintiff can show that he had legal title to the money received by 
the subsequent recipient, ie, through tracing (Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson 
[1990] Ch 265 at 285–288), or perhaps, exceptionally, where the plaintiff has 
a claim in restitution against the immediate recipient, and the latter in turn 
has a restitutionary claim based on the same unjust factor against the 
subsequent recipient (by analogy with Khan v Permayer [2001] BPIR 95). In 
academic literature, it has been argued that for earmarked sums which are 
paid out for a specific purpose, proprietary claims may lie upon the failure of 
the purpose (Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press, 
2nd Ed, 2005)); but apart from Quistclose trust cases in equity (from Barclays 
Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567 (“Quistclose”)) where 
equitable title has been retained by the plaintiff, there is no support for this 
proposition in the common law authorities, and there is nothing in the 
District Court (or High Court) judgment that suggested that this argument 
was being made. It is therefore not surprising that the District Court judge 
took an approach in substance that the claim was being made by a beneficial 
owner following trust money. The plaintiff, having failed to establish the 
extent of his beneficial interest in the money which he sought to follow, must 
fail in his claim. 
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19.35 The reasoning in equity also explains why the District Court judge 
was concerned that the plaintiff should have to prove beneficial ownership. 
The confusion in the High Court arose from the conflation with the 
common law action for money had and received. In the common law action, 
it is not necessary to show that what the defendant has retained is owned by 
the plaintiff. But it is necessary to show that what the defendant has received 
was owned by the plaintiff at law (or, at least in a world of relative legal title, 
that the plaintiff had a right to immediate possession to the money). This is 
to establish the basic proposition that the defendant’s benefit was received 
(though not necessarily retained) at the plaintiff ’s expense (assuming that 
this claim is one to reverse unjust enrichment; otherwise it is to demonstrate 
that it is the plaintiff ’s property that is being protected). 
19.36 In the High Court (supra para 19.30), counsel for the plaintiff 
argued and the judge accepted that the plaintiff did not have to show 
ownership to establish his claim in the action for money had and received. 
While plaintiff ’s counsel argued that it was enough that the plaintiff should 
show possessory title, or alternatively that the plaintiff had standing to sue by 
dint of having some beneficial ownership in the money, the judge appeared 
to focus on the point that there was no need for the plaintiff to show 
beneficial title to make the common law claim (at [91]). On the facts, there 
was no evidence to contradict the prima facie position that, once it was found 
that the plaintiff was the source of the payment to the first defendant, the 
plaintiff had sufficient legal title to succeed in an action for money had and 
received. The decision did not go so far as to endorse counsel’s argument that 
possessory title (as opposed to legal ownership) was sufficient to found a 
claim for money had and received. However, there was nothing to show how 
the second defendant became liable on a common law claim; there was no 
analysis of the plaintiff ’s title to trace, or the process of tracing, legal title to 
the second defendant through the various bank accounts, nor is it clear how 
the plaintiff could, as a result of tracing, assert legal title to the second 
defendant’s chose in action against her bank. 
19.37 On the other hand, the case is easily explicable from the perspective 
of equity. A classic Quistclose (supra para 19.34) trust had been created 
because the first defendant had received money from the plaintiff to be used 
solely for a specific purpose. The plaintiff was claiming beneficial title in the 
property held by the second defendant at common law, by virtue of the 
receipt of trust property, with knowledge of the breach of trust, and his claim 
ultimately failed because he could not prove the extent of his beneficial 
ownership. The eventual order of the High Court was made to protect the 
interests of the beneficial owners, including the plaintiff. So what appears at 
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first sight to be a case of equitable intervention in a common law action for 
restitution is better explained as one of the operation of equity within the law 
of property.  
The first-in-first-out rule in Clayton’s case 
19.38 The nature of the rule in Clayton’s case (Devaynes v Noble (1816) 
1 Mer 572; 35 ER 767) was considered briefly in observation by Andrew 
Phang Boon Leong JC (as he then was) in Q & M Enterprises Sdn Bhd v Poh 
Kiat [2005] 4 SLR 494. The rule in Clayton’s case states that unless otherwise 
agreed between two parties in a creditor-debtor relationship and in the 
absence of contrary appropriation by either party at the time of payment, 
sums paid to the credit of a current account are to be applied in discharge of 
the indebtedness in the order in which the indebtedness was incurred. This 
rule is also considered applicable in the context of equitable tracing, in 
particular, the following of trust money through bank accounts. 
19.39 The case itself deals with the question of the relationship between an 
application for summary judgment on the merits and an application for stay 
of proceedings on the basis that the Singapore court was not the appropriate 
forum to hear the case. In the course of dealing with the issue whether 
summary judgment was appropriate in the circumstances in the first place, 
the judicial commissioner considered that there was clearly at least one 
triable legal issue whether the rule in Clayton’s case could apply on the facts 
of the case, and that there were additional questions of fact which needed to 
be determined if the rule was found to be applicable (at [50]–[62]). The 
plaintiff, a Malaysian-registered company, was suing the defendant, a 
Singapore national, on a personal guarantee furnished to the plaintiff for a 
loan provided by the plaintiff to a Malaysian manufacturing company. The 
defendant contended that the loan had in fact been fully repaid by the 
principal borrower by virtue of certain sums paid by the borrower to the 
plaintiff. 
19.40 Without ruling on any point, because it was enough for the court to 
find the existence of triable issues, the judicial commissioner observed that 
the rule in Clayton’s case may not necessarily be confined to banker-
customer relationships (at [55] and [58]). The judicial commissioner also 
observed that the perceived arbitrariness of the rule has led judges in 
England frequently to distinguish Clayton’s case on the facts and suggested 
that an acknowledgement by the Singapore court of the true nature of the 
rule as an evidential presumption rather than a substantive rule of law would 
counter many of the criticisms directed against the rule (at [56]–[57]). 
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Free acceptance? Abandoned and non-existent contracts 
19.41 In Kensteel Engineering Pte Ltd v OSV Engineering Pte Ltd [2005] 
2 SLR 253, issues arose as to remuneration for services rendered under a 
contract which was subsequently abandoned, as well as for services rendered 
after the contract was abandoned without the formation of a new contract. 
The plaintiff had sued the defendant under two different contracts, but for 
the purpose of this review, the concern is only with the defendant’s 
counterclaim in respect of one of the contracts. The plaintiff had engaged the 
defendant as a subcontractor to design and fabricate parts of an air 
ventilation system for a certain building project. There was a dispute as to the 
terms of the agreement, and the plaintiff was suing the defendant for breach 
of contract for failure to deliver by the contractual deadlines. In turn, the 
defendant counterclaimed for work done for the plaintiff. 
19.42 Andrew Ang JC (as he then was) found that there had been no 
breach of contract by the defendant. In respect of the counterclaim, the 
judicial commissioner found (at [43]) that it was clear from the conduct of 
the contracting parties that they had agreed to abandon their mutual rights 
under the agreement, and that what the parties had subsequently agreed to 
(essentially that the plaintiff would take over the work assigned to the 
defendant and the defendant’s role would be reduced to one of consultation) 
was not sufficiently precise to amount to a fresh contract (at [44]). 
Nevertheless, it was clear to the judicial commissioner that the defendant was 
entitled to be paid on a quantum meruit basis for the work partially done 
before the mutual abandonment of the contract as well as for the work done 
thereafter (at [45]). 
19.43 The only reasoning provided to support the decision to allow the 
counterclaim was short and sharp: “it was obvious that the plaintiff could not 
take the benefit of what had been performed by the defendant for free” (ibid). 
The court did not elaborate on why the success of the quantum meruit claims 
was obvious. On a restitutionary analysis, the rationale could lie in the 
plaintiff ’s free acceptance of the work done by the defendant in 
circumstances where the services were clearly of economic value to the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff knew that the services were not offered for free, the 
plaintiff had a free choice whether to accept or reject the services, and the 
plaintiff voluntarily accepted the services. 
19.44 There are two other alternative explanations; but it is less clear that 
they can be made out on the facts, so to that extent these lines of reasoning 
are less “obvious”. One is that the defendant was entitled to recover for total 
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failure of consideration as the services were done (to the knowledge and 
acquiescence of the plaintiff) on the basis that the original contract would 
continue to exist. A further explanation for recovery for services conferred 
after the abandonment of the contract is that the subsequent services were 
conferred under a mistake (whether of fact or law) that a new contract had 
been formed between the parties. As the latter two lines of reasoning would 
require findings of fact which are not evident in the judgment, it would 
appear that, in so far as the decision on the counterclaim was based on the 
unjust enrichment of the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant, the 
“obvious” basis for recovery lies in the free acceptance of the benefit, even if 
this basis of restitutionary ground has not yet been expressly accepted by the 
courts in Singapore. 
19.45 The court did not directly address the question of the effect of any 
contractual allocation of risks on the restitutionary claims. However, the 
court did expressly reject (at [41]) the plaintiff ’s argument that there was an 
implied term between the parties that the defendant was to bear all the costs 
on the ground that there was no basis for implying such a term. The 
argument was apparently to the effect that the implied term was part of the 
original contract (the court rejected the argument on the alternative ground 
that such a term would be unnecessary on the basis of the plaintiff ’s position 
that the contract had been terminated for breach). No argument appeared to 
be directed to the question whether there was any risk allocation in the 
contract of abandonment itself that would be disturbed by allowing the 
restitutionary claims; but it would appear to be equally difficult to base any 
such argument on the facts, especially since the contract of abandonment 
was inferred from conduct. Thus, there did not appear to be any contractual 
risk allocation to bar the restitutionary claims in this case. 
Mistaken payment and the Workmen’s Compensation Act  
19.46 Kamis bin Satari v Nasir Natarajan [2006] 1 SLR 102 deals with the 
problem of mistaken payments in the context of the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act (Cap 354, 1998 Rev Ed). The plaintiff had been injured in 
the course of employment allegedly caused by the fault of the defendant, his 
co-worker, while travelling in a vehicle owned by their employer. The defence 
was conducted by the employer’s insurer of the vehicle involved. The plaintiff 
had sought from the vehicle insurer $10,000 as interim payment of damages, 
and the insurer agreed to and made an interim payment of $5,000 to the 
plaintiff. The insurer subsequently discovered that the plaintiff had already 
received compensation of $11,025 from another of his employer’s insurers 
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Section 18(a) of the statute 
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provides that the injured workman shall not be entitled to recover both 
damages under the general law and compensation under the statute. The 
vehicle insurer applied to strike out the plaintiff ’s claim and for the return of 
the $5,000 interim payment. The deputy registrar allowed the application 
and the decision was upheld by a district judge. The plaintiff appealed to the 
High Court. 
19.47 In the High Court, the plaintiff argued that he should be allowed to 
keep the statutory compensation and to maintain the common law action 
because he had genuinely thought that the statutory compensation was an 
interim payment from the vehicle insurer. Disbelieving that the plaintiff had 
made a genuine mistake in the light of the evidence presented, Woo Bih Li J 
dismissed the argument and the appeal. 
19.48 Woo J also dismissed the appeal on the alternative basis that there 
had indeed been a genuine mistake. On the facts, the plaintiff claimed that he 
had spent the money and was unable to return the sum. The judge held (at 
[9]) that although the statute was silent on the issue, a workman who had 
received compensation under a genuine mistake could, by returning the 
compensation so received, nevertheless proceed with an action in damages. 
The judge dismissed the proposal of counsel for the plaintiff that the 
compensation could be deducted from the eventual damages awarded, 
pointing out (at [14]) that there was no certainty that the plaintiff would 
win, or be awarded a sum exceeding the compensation awarded even if he 
won. Moreover, the judge held that as a matter of policy, to allow the plaintiff 
to continue with the action for damages in such cases without first requiring 
the return of the compensation could lead to abuse; it could encourage 
employees not to disclose the fact of compensation under the statute while 
maintaining an action against some person other than the employer, and to 
plead mistake when discovered. 
19.49 There was, strictly speaking, no obligation to return the 
compensation awarded under the statute. The workman is entitled to keep 
the money, except that in that event he would be disentitled from suing for 
damages at general law. The court had implied into the legislation a 
condition that a workman who accepts compensation by a genuine mistake 
can reverse that compensation and seek damages under the general law 
instead. This is consistent with a purposive reading of the statutory 
provision; it is unlikely that the provision is intended to take a penal attitude 
towards honestly mistaken workmen. 
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19.50 The interim payment was not made by order of the court, but by the 
agreement of the parties. Had it been paid under an order of court, the court 
could simply have ordered its return upon the striking out of the action 
(O 29 r 17 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2004 Rev Ed). The return of 
the money would, in the circumstances, therefore have to be based on 
contract (an express or implied obligation to return the money if the action 
were struck out) or restitution. Although the court did not elaborate on the 
reasons for the return of the money, it would not be difficult to argue for 
such an implied term in the agreement if it was not express. 
19.51 As far as the law of restitution is concerned, this is probably an 
obvious case where restitution ought to be ordered. There are several possible 
explanations. It would appear that the vehicle insurer had paid the money to 
the plaintiff under a mistake of fact that the workman had not received any 
compensation under the statute, and consequently the plaintiff had been 
unjustly enriched at the insurer’s expense. It is probable that the insurer 
would not have paid the money had it known at the time of payment of the 
earlier compensation received by the plaintiff; the insurer would not have 
paid the money but for the mistake. That would appear to be sufficient to 
ground an action for money had and received, even if, based on the judge’s 
holding on the law, the plaintiff could still have maintained the common law 
action for damages by returning the compensation. However, the problem 
with this reasoning is that there was an underlying contract under which the 
payment was made. So long as the payment was made pursuant to a valid 
contractual obligation, the mistake cannot ground a restitutionary claim 
(Info-communications Development Authority of Singapore v Singapore 
Telecommunications Ltd (No 2) (supra para 19.26). For the mistake reasoning 
in restitution to work, the contract would have to be argued to be void for 
mistake in the first place. 
19.52 Alternatively, it could be argued that the agreement for payment was 
terminated upon the striking out of the action, and the payment had been 
made on the condition of the continuing existence of the agreement; 
recovery would be based on total failure of consideration. The argument 
based on failure of consideration could even work if the contract was still 
valid, provided that it was clear that the restitutionary claim was not 
inconsistent with the contractual risk allocation: Roxboroughs v Rothmans of 
Pall Mall Australia Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 516. Yet another possibility is that the 
basis of the payment (that the payer would be found liable) disappeared the 
moment the action was struck out; but this line of reasoning depends on the 
new Birksian theory of absence of basis (Birks, Unjust Enrichment (supra 
para 19.34)), which has yet to receive endorsement by the courts (the initial 
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response from the English Court of Appeal has been somewhat lukewarm: 
see Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners 
[2006] Ch 243 at [274]. 
